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barred from raising this new claim for the first time in response to 
Appellant's Brief. But, were this claim properly before the Court, it 
would fail because Father (Appellant), in agreeing that Kory should 
be in the care of Grandparents while Father was overseas, neither 
"lost custody" nor relinquished his parental rights, so the lower 
court was correct in finding that the parental presumption, in which 
part of a parent's due process rights inhere, was in place 4 
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contrary to federal and state law thus violating Father's 
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1. Grandparents (Intervenors/Appellees) did not appeal the trial court's finding 
(#4) that "the parental presumption is in place in this instance,"and should be 
barred from raising this new claim for the first time in response to Appellant's 
Brief. But, were this claim properly before the Court, it would fail because 
Father (Appellant), in agreeing that Kory should be in the care of Grandparents 
while Father was overseas and during a period of time when Father was unable 
to care for Kory properly, neither "lost custody" nor relinquished his parental 
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rights, so the lower court was correct in finding that the parental presumption, 
in which part of a parent's due process rights inhere, was in place. 
2. The record clearly demonstrates that Father's constitutional right to the custody 
and control of his child, i.e., the parental presumption, was in place, was not 
rebutted by sufficient evidence, but was subordinated to a comparative "best 
interests of the child" analysis, contrary to federal and state law thus violating 
Father's constitutional rights as elucidated in Troxel v. Granville. 120 S.Ct. 
2054(2000) were violated (See Appellant's Brief, C-E, at pp. 2-3; 13-31). 
SUMMARY OF REPLY BRIEF 
The trial court properly found that "as demonstrated in the record and pleadings, a 
change of circumstances has been presented to allow modification of the prior [custody] order." 
Findings of Fact #2; R. at 368, p. 68, lines 17-22. Father sought modification of the prior order 
not only because the custody arrangement was always intended to be temporary (R. at 54, 66, 
67), but also because Grandparents made no changes in their attitude towards Father and 
continued to attempt to interfere his right to a parental relationship with Kory and with his 
visitation with Kory. R. at 37; Evaluation at 12, 14-15. Through court action, Father has finally 
been able to exercise consistent visitation and re-establish the bonds with his child that were 
broken when the state of California contacted Grandparents and allowed them to take possession 
of Kory when Father was stationed abroad. The record clearly demonstrates that Appellant has a 
stable family life (R. At 368, pp. 26-27), and his availability to be a parent has improved since his 
divorce and discharge from the military. It is also clear that Father's wife enjoys caring for Kory 
and his step-sisters (R. At 368, p 31); that Father and his wife have made and continue to make 
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financial sacrifices for Kory (R. At 368, pp. 27, 34-35), and Father has a stable family life and 
secure relationships, (R. At 368, p. 39), and, while he may not be as mature as the grandparents 
he was being compared with, his maturity level is consonant with his age (R. At 368, p. 26, lines 
20-25; p, 39, lines 19-23). 
The trial court properly found that the parental presumption was in place. Though they 
had the burden of proof in rebutting the parental presumption, Grandparents presented no 
evidence at trial. The Custody Evaluator acknowledged that his evaluation completed in 
December of 1998 was a best interests comparative custodian evaluation (R. At 368, p. 9, lines 
21-24; p. 49),1 based on no standardized tests (R. At 368, p. 12), but which relied heavily on 
hearsay.2 Months later, without any additional contact with the parties or with Kory, Evaluator 
submitted a "minimal addendum" (R. 368, at p. 49) which recast the already-completed evaluation 
in terms of Hutchison factors admittedly unfamiliar to the Evaluator (R. 368, at p. 49)3. 
Despite Father's objections to the weight given hearsay in the Evaluation (R. At 368, p. 
65, lines 15-21), the court considered the Evaluator's testimony "constructive" (R. At 368, pp. 
1
 In the introduction to his Evaluation (p. 1), Evaluator states that the "the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the father and the grandparents have been evaluated with respect to 
their parenting style, their approach to discipline, their personal values, as well as moral and 
ethical considerations." Clearly, Evaluator saw his task as a comparative custodian best interests 
analysis. 
2
 Evaluator made no effort to corroborate the first six pages of "information" in the 
15-page Evaluation (R. at 368, pp. 16-19; pp.40-41, 52-53); Evaluator not sure he could consider 
portions of what he reported in the Evaluation as "facts"; Evaluator did not follow up on contacts 
Father gave him to verify Father's claims because "that was after my report had been submitted. I 
was comfortable with the information I had at the time, so, no, I did not do any follow-up on 
[difficulty of getting hardship discharge]," pp. 40-41). 
3
 Evaluator introduced his Addendum with the incorrect observation that the 
Hutchison factors "give rise to the issue of parental presumption." 
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64-65), and made it clear that any evidence offered to rebut the hearsay would be of no avail, 
because the court had already decided the issue of custody based on the Evaluator's "reports" and 
the Court's interview with Kory (R. At 368, p. 65, lines 3-10). 
Both the Evaluator and the Court rendered the parental presumption "illusory" (See 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982) by treating the comparative custodian best 
interests analysis as evidence rebutting the parental presumption. This was plain error, and is 
appealable whether preserved in the lower court or raised for the first time on appeal.(See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-2, and citations therein. ) This court should award custody of Kory to his 
Father, who, with his wife and their children, are eager to integrate Kory fiilly into their family life 
in a way that will reduce any anxiety Kory may feel about a change of residence (R. At 368, p. 26, 
lines 2-6). 
Argument 
1. Grandparents (Intervenors/Appellees) did not appeal the trial court's finding (#4) 
that "the parental presumption is in place in this instance,"and should be barred 
from raising this new claim for the first time in response to Appellant's Brief. 
But, were this claim properly before the Court, it would fail because Father 
(Appellant), in agreeing that Kory should be in the care of Grandparents while 
Father was overseas and until he was able to reestablish himself in Utah and 
reestablish his parental relationship with Kory, neither "lost custody" nor 
relinquished his parental rights, so the lower court was correct in finding that the 
parental presumption, in which part of a parent's due process rights inhere, was 
in place. 
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Prior to responding to Appellant's brief filed with this Court, Grandparents never denied 
that the parental presumption was in place in this case and must be rebutted. If they wanted to 
contest that point, they should have appealed the finding of the trial court. They should not be 
allowed to appeal this issue at this late juncture. 
The parties stipulated to a custody evaluation, which was submitted December 28, 
1998. When it came back, Grandparents' Counsel, obviously aware that the parental presumption 
was in place and must be rebutted before Rule 4-903 comparative analysis is applied, gave the 
custody evaluator a list of the Hutchison factors, and a copy of State ex rel M.W.. 970P.2d 284 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) afFd in part and rev'd in part 12 P. 3d 80 (Utah 2000). R. at 368, p. 49-
51), and asked the evaluator to address those factors. R. at 368, p. 49. If the parental presumption 
did not apply, there would have been no reason for their attorney to request that the evaluator 
consider the Hutchison factors. In effect, Grandparents' Brief is an appeal of the trial court's 
finding that the parental presumption was in place, and that appeal should be rejected by this 
Court. 
However, if that claim were properly before the court, it should be rejected, because 
Father never "lost custody,"as claimed by Grandparents. Father was Kory's primary caretaker; he 
sought unsuccessfully to avoid deployment overseas. R. at 256. While Father was deployed 
overseas, Mother neglected child, and Grandparents took custody of Child rather than have 
custody go to the state of California. Father was not even notified about the neglect and the 
child's removal to Utah until months after Grandparents obtained the child. Because he was still 
subject to deployment by the U.S. Navy, he agreed to allow Grandparents to continue to care for 
Kory temporarily. 
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From the time Grandparents were awarded temporary custody of Kory in September 
1994, until his honorable discharge from the Navy, Father made repeated, but unsuccessful 
application for a hardship discharge in order to care for Kory. R. at 368, p.29, lines 8-20, lines 1-
8; Evaluation at 11. Because Father did not at that time have physical custody of Kory, he was 
battling a Catch-22 situation: without physical custody of Kory the Navy wouldn't grant the 
hardship discharge; because the Navy was deploying him overseas, he couldn't be considered by a 
court as a good candidate for physical custody. When he was in the United States, Father 
traveled to Utah as often as possible to see Kory (Evaluation at 4, 9, 10), but Grandparents' 
efforts to obstruct the relationship resulted in Father seldom being able to visit Kory more than 
once during a week-long leave, and Grandparents refused to allow Father to take Kory overnight. 
R. at 368, p. 41, lines 12-24; Evaluation at 4, 9, 10. Grandparents flippantly dismiss Father's 
plight with the assertion that "it is evident that Father voluntarily relinquished custody of Kory 
when having custody did not fit with Father's choice of military lifestyle." (Apppellees' Brief at 
20). The Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act 50 App. U.S.C. Section 501 has attempted to 
remedy the very real constraints which military personnel face in legal proceedings to which they 
are parties when on active duty, but not all of those problems are addressed merely by staying the 
proceedings. 
Father's parental fitness was never adjudicated, nor did he relinquish his parental rights 
at any time. What he did do was attempt to make the best of what became an increasingly 
difficult custody arrangement during a period of time in which he could control neither the U. S 
Government's determination of where he should live nor Grandparents' willingness to allow 
visitation when he was on leave. He, like the father in Duncan v. Howard. 918 P.2d. 888, 893 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1996), sought as much contact with Kory as his deployer and Kory's 
Grandparents would allow. As was the case with the father in Duncan, "[g]iven the opportunity 
to bond more fully with his father he would most likely develop a closer bond and a more normal 
father/son relationship. Evaluation, at 7. This case presents an issue of first impression in the 
interpretation of the Hutchison factors: can parental absence which is beyond the parent's control 
be used as evidence to rebut the parental presumption? Needless to say, this presents a significant 
policy issue for parents in the military, and for parents who through no fault of their own may 
have little access to their children, and so are limited in the amount of "bonding time" available to 
them. 
By their repeated use of the phrase "lost custody," Grandparents imply that the custody 
arrangement was something akin to foster care or adoption by Grandparents. The divorce 
proceedings included no investigation of parental fitness, and Father stipulated to continuing the 
custody arrangement in order to obtain court-ordered visitation to enable him to renew the close 
relationship he had with Kory before Grandparents' actions threatened to sever their bond 
altogether. Father's stipulation to what was in Kory's best interest at that time did not extinguish 
his parental rights or his entitlement to the parental presumption and did permit him to bring suit 
in the trial court to seek custody of Kory when enumerated factors constituting a change in 
circumstances warranted a change of custody. 
2. The record clearly demonstrates that Father's constitutional right to the custody 
and control of his child, i.e., the parental presumption, was in place, was not 
rebutted by sufficient evidence, but was subordinated to a comparative "best 
interests of the child" analysis, contrary to federal and state law and thus violating 
7 
Father's constitutional rights as elucidated in Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 
2054(2000)(See Appellant's Brief, C-E, at pp. 2-3; 13-31). 
The Utah Supreme Court was crystal clear in Hutchison that the parental presumption 
"cannot be rebutted merely by demonstrating that the opposing party possesses superior 
qualifications, has established a deeper bond with the child, or is able to provide more desirable 
circumstances." Hutchison, at 41. Yet, comparative custodian analysis was the only evidence 
advanced by Grandparents and that evidence was third or fourth hearsay via the Custody 
Evaluator as the Grandparents, who had the burden of proof, presented no evidence at trial. 
The Custody Evaluator's Addendum was not based on any further contact with the 
parties or with Kory (R. At 368, p. 35 lines 17-p. 36, linel), as the Evaluator simply repackaged 
his hearsay information and recommendations under Hutchison factor headings, and submitted 
them to the court March 17, 1999.4 Clearly the Evaluatory/rs/ performed a comparative analysis 
of the best interests of the child, and then explicitly used that analysis to conclude that "Travis 
does not appear to have demonstrated the 'Hutchison factors' with regard to Kory over the 
duration of his son's childhood." Addendum, concluding paragraph. That statement shows that 
the Evaluator misunderstood who had the burden of proof in this case, and did not understand 
that a comparative custodian best interests analysis is not legally sufficient to rebut the parental 
presumption. 
The Evaluator improperly first focused on a best interests analysis and the "factors 
considered by Utah courts in making custody decisions when the parental presumption is not an 
4
 The Addendum is misdated "1998," but Evaluator's testimony (R. At 368, p. 49) 
clarifies that the Addendum was submitted several months after the Evaluation submitted 
December 28, 1998, so had to be in 1999. 
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issue." Duncan v. Howard, 918 P.2d. 888, 893 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)(R. 368, p. 9). When 
gathering his information months before considering the parental presumption, the Evaluator, like 
the experts in Duncan, concentrated on the potential "difficult adjustment" for Kory that a 
custody change might require (although the Evaluator assumed that a change of custody could 
only happen "summarily," rather than gradually, as Father had anticipated). That focus on best 
interests before the parental presumption has been rebutted is plain error. 
The trial court found that the parental presumption was in place, but appears to have 
viewed it as merely one aspect of a best interests analysis. (R. At 69,1. 20 ff; R. at 73,1. 5-11). It 
appears that the determinative factor for the trial court, as with the Evaluator, was the potential 
stress that Kory might experience if custody were changed. Yet "the trial court and [the appellate] 
court cannot consider anything beyond the three characteristics giving rise to the parental 
presumption until that presumption has been rebutted or otherwise lost." Duncan, 893. 
In their reply brief Grandparents assert, contrary to the Utah Supreme Court, and the 
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Troxel, that "The sole purpose of the parental presumption is to 
serve the best interests of the child." Grandparents are wrong on this point. "The parental 
presumption was judicially created to protect both the rights of natural parents and the best 
interests of children." State ex rel. H.R.V., 906 P. 2d 913, 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), citing 
Hutchison . 40 ("This presumption recognizes 'the natural right and authority of the parent to the 
child's custody.'" (quoting State ex rel.Jennings. 20 Utah 2d 50, 52, 432 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 
1987)). 
Subordinating parental presumption to comparative analysis erases parental rights 
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altogether.5 The Utah Supreme Court's stated that "If the [parental] presumption could be 
rebutted merely by evidence that a nonparent would be a superior custodian, "the parent's natural 
where possible, by his or her natural parent." Hutchison, at 41. 
Clearly the Court also mistook Evaluator's repackaged Rule 4 903 comparative 
analysis for legally sufficient evidence rebutting the Hutchison factors, despite Evaluator's 
obviously muddled understanding of Hutchison and the burden of proof it places on the 
nonlawyers (R. at pp. 71-72), the Court itself categorizes the Hutchison factors as "factors to be 
considered in determining the best interests and welfare of Cory[sic]." R at 368, p. 74, lines 11-
13. The Court explicitly characterizes the Hutchison factors as "factors in this case as to what's 
in his [Kory's] best interests." R. at 368, p. 79,11. 13-15. In addition, even if the Court had been 
proper!} considei pai ath <re analysis, the Court's statement that the i easons foi which 
Father did not have custody of Kory were not relevant to the court's decision about custody (R. 
At 368, p. 65, lines 3-8; p. 66, lines 8-10) is also plain error, and contrary to the directive of 
UCJA 4-903(3)(E)(v) which specifically lists any reasons a parent may have relinquished custody 
in the past as being relevant to the determination of custody. 
Characterizii ig t! le pai ei ital pi esumption as oi ily oi ic factoi It i a bests interests of the 
child analysis is contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of parental presumption in Troxel 
(see discussion in Appellant's brief, pp. 31-34) and contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's analysis 
See Evaluator's conclusions-all stated in comparative custodian best interests 
terms- at Evaluation 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13. 
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of parental presumption in Hutchison, where the Court directed that the best interests analysis 
occur only after the parental presumption has been rebutted. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
L.A.W. v. State of Utah, 378 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 34 (2000), cautioned that 
the [parental] presumption in a custody case serves to protect a parent's rights 
in his or her children in the same way that requiring proof of unfitness in a 
termination of parental rights case does. Without the presumption, a parent 
would be required to engage in custody battles with nonparents based solely 
on the children's best interests. A parent's constitutional and natural right in 
his or her children are too important to allow such a result. Cf. In re J.P., 648 
P.2d at 1376 (noting "the standard of'best interest' of the child [alone] 
provides an open invitation to trample on individual rights through trendy 
redefinitions and administrative or judicial abuse). 
Because both the Evaluator and the court used the comparative custodian analysis as evidence to 
rebut the parental presumption, Father's right to custody was challenged solely on the child's best 
interest, an outcome the justices decried, warning that the circumstances in which a parent may 
lose the parental presumption must "be narrowly defined to ensure that a parent's rights remain 
protected." IdL The Court further explained that the parental presumption cannot be lost 
"without a court ever ruling on whether the parent's parenting skills are deficient," for "such a 
result would routinely expose a parent to the loss of custody of his or her children based solely on 
the children's best int interests, a standard recognized to be vulnerable to abuse. See In re J.P., 
648 P. 2d at 1376. Certainly, this result is unacceptable in light of the parent's constitutional and 
natural rights to custody of his or her children. LA. W., at 35. 
Further, the lower court appears to have given determinative weight either to the young 
child's preference (R. at 368, p. 81, lines 17-22), characterized by this Court in Bake v. Bake, 772 
P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) as "an exceptional criterion upon which to base the custody 
11 
determination/'6 or upon concern about the child's adjustment period if custody were changed—an 
impermissible consideration while the parental presumption is in place (See Duncan, at 893), and 
certain!} a factoi that can, be addressed ii i a rei inification plai i 
Conclusion 
Grandparents Reply Brief, with the exception of occasional sentences scattered therein, 
does not respond to Appellant's arguments A-F. Those issues of first impression in defining and 
consistently applying the Hutchison factors (i.e., the definition of the "particular point in time"; 
be rebutted by parental absence which was beyond the control of the parent; and whether in this 
case, the lower court's application of the Hutchison analysis violated the constitutional rights 
elucidated in Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)(See Appellant's Brief at C-E, pp. 2-3, 
13-31). These issues have not and cannot be answered by Appellees, because the floating 
this case. 
Grandparents choose to argue a point they should have argued in the trial court, or 
argued in appealing the findings, but only now for the first time introduce. In addition, they 
provide no justification for the plain error which occurred in allowing a comparative custodian 
analysis !o be used as "evidence" intended to rebut the pai ei ital pi esi imptiol i 
This court, should find, as it did in Duncan, that though Father "never has had custody 
of [Kory]," "he litis «r\ti lost \m nyM musseil the presumption due to an adjudication of any 
6
 In Bake, the two children were 9 and 11 years old, respectively; Kory was 7 when 
his preference was apparently given determinative weight. 
12 
lack of fitness as a parent." At 892. Like the father in Duncan, Father "has visited [Kory] when 
able, and [has] been involved in extensive litigation seeking visitation rights and then custody of 
[Kory]. At 894. Therefore, he still benefits from the parental presumption unless the 
[Grandparents] successfully rebut it." Duncan, at 892 (reaffirmed in State ex rel M. W. 970P.2d 
284 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) afFd in part and rev'd in part 12 P. 3d 80 2000 UT 79, 12 P.3d 80, 
85). Grandparents did not rebut the parental presumption, but advanced a comparative custodian 
analysis at the trial court level and now at the appellate level. Failure of the lower court to require 
that rebuttal of the parental presumption prior to the consideration of comparative custodian 
analysis is a violation of the parent's due process rights, and is plain error which the Court may 
correct. (See Appellant's Brief pages 1-2 and citations therein) 
This Court followed that analysis in Duncan, and should follow that analysis in this case, 
and return Kory to the custody of his Father as it did in Duncan. 
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing arguments, the appellate court should reverse 
the decision of the trial court, and award custody of Kory to his Father, Travis Davis. 
Dated this 2nd day of April ,2001. 
,—^// 0 ; yj^y / y -/ 
LINDA QUINTOlNr: 
Attorney for Appellant, Travis Davis 
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